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ply assumes it. Why else would the public be so “crazy”
(p. 69) as to disagree with economics “experts”? His only
actual argument for mass economic irrationality, however,
is that it can provide an RCT explanation of nonrandom
mass opinion. He gives no reason to believe that rational
irrationality “exists”—except as a solution to a problem in
the theory of rational choice.
However, the fact that Caplan fails to prove that ratio-
nal irrationality exists in the real world does not mean that
there is nothing in the real world to be explained. Emo-
tion and ideology, not to mention error, are plentiful in
politics, amply deserving the attention he pays them. But
to explain them as rational choices, he has to assign them
to the mass level, where they can be seen as corollaries of
the average voter’s insignificance.
Caplan references, but does not seem to have under-
stood, Philip Converse’s “The Nature of Belief Systems
in Mass Publics” (David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Dis-
content, 1964), which showed that ideology tends to be
the province of the well-informed few, not the ignorant
masses. More recent political-psychology literature on
“motivated reasoning” suggests that people cling dogmat-
ically to their beliefs—by using their knowledge to
fend off discrepant information. Thus, “ideological
constraint” would be likelier among relatively knowledge-
able elites than relatively ignorant masses—as Converse
found.
Elite dogmatism, however, fits uncomfortably with RCT.
The politically knowledgeable few would tend to have
greater incentives than typical voters to avoid stubbornly
clinging to what might be mistaken ideas, because all
things being equal, the politically knowledgeable would
likelier be politicians, bureaucrats, political activists,
terrorists—even economists or political scientists—who
influence politics much more than average voters do.
Caplan would predict that influential elites are less ideo-
logical than average voters, yet at least with knowledge-
able elites, the opposite holds. They seem inclined toward
dogmatism regardless of the incentive to keep an open
mind (cf. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment, 2006).
But then, the world they are trying to understand is
complicated. In confronting complexity, people err inad-
vertently (and nonrandomly, for cognitive and cultural
reasons): not by choice, but by accident. And the more
misleading information people inadvertently accumulate,
the easier it is to fend off discrepant information. Here,
dogmatism is unintentional. In RCT, though, everything—
even “irrationality”—is intentional. Extracting from this
hyper-rationalism a plausible theory of mistake may sim-
ply be impossible.
These days, understanding political error and dogma is
especially crucial. But judging from The Myth of the Ratio-
nal Voter, that objective might best be advanced by leaving
RCT behind—no matter how dogmatically economists
cling to this particular error.
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The two books under review differ sharply on the fruit-
fulness of rational choice theory. Karen Cook, Russell Har-
din, and Margaret Levi posit that even trust is best
understood as a product of rational, materialist calcula-
tions. On their “encapsulated interest” view, trust “exists
when one party to [a] relation believes the other party has
incentive to act in his or her interest or to take his or her
interests to heart” (p. 2). But can incentives truly whisper
to the heart? Michael Taylor decries the baleful conse-
quences, both intellectual and practical, that stem from
assimilating all reasoned decision making to the numeri-
cal weighing of material incentives and ignoring the role
of heartfelt personal and moral commitments.
Cook, Hardin, and Levi find it most useful to define
trust as resting not only on incentives but specifically on
those incentives arising from the desire for repeated per-
sonal interactions. The major contention of their book is
that trust in this sense can play only a limited role in
sustaining cooperation in contemporary mass societies.
Even allowing for some transitivity of trust across social
networks, the individual in a contemporary society must
cooperate with multitudes of people for whom a future of
prospective dealings with the individual or that person’s
trusted associates casts no shadow. Various substitutes for
trust are thus required if cooperation is to proceed. The
authors consider many examples, among them fictive kin-
ship relations employed by Kenyan pastoralists, associa-
tions that license professionals such as doctors or lawyers,
and state organs of coercion and regulation.
The sheer variety of these topics is a problem. The ter-
rain of alternatives to trust is vast. Even a selective survey
of this terrain yields conclusions of such extreme general-
ity as to be almost devoid of content. Doubtless the authors
are on safe ground in stating that “distrust and lack of
trust are more likely than trust . . . to motivate us to create
the institutions that allow us to cooperate with each other
and treat each other as trustworthy” (p. 186). However,
this verity offers little guidance into launching an investi-
gation of concrete empirical situations.
As a result, reading the book’s many short treatments of
the dilemmas of cooperation in various realms is a frus-
trating experience: They fail to cumulate and are generally
too abbreviated to be satisfactory on their own terms. For
instance, in illustrating how large-scale social transitions
destabilize established structures of cooperation, the authors
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contend that the U.S. Civil War eliminated “[t]raditional
patterns of reciprocity,” and “slaves once entrusted with
children and valued property became subjects of distrust
and fear” (p. 169). Whatever its (dubious) empirical mer-
its, the idea that slavery enabled reciprocity and trust
between owners and owned flatly contradicts the authors’
own earlier analysis of how power asymmetries under-
mine trust.
While this puzzling vision of slavery serves just a minus-
cule expository role in the text, the failure to deal consis-
tently with the implications of expressed theoretical views
is a broader problem. Cook, Hardin, and Levi argue that
actors are always interrogating the contours of counter-
parties’ interests, always looking forward, always assessing
whether those in whom they place trust will continue to
face a set of incentives prompting trustworthy behavior.
Trust is accordingly specific and situational. But another
core argument seems to belie the point.The authors repeat-
edly claim that enforcement-backed formal institutions
are an important precursor to trust, “encourag[ing] citi-
zens to take the small risks with others that facilitate their
learning who is reliable, even trustworthy, and how to
distinguish the reliable from those who are not”(p. 159).
However, on an incentive-based view, this argument is
incoherent: Loaning you a ballpoint pen gives me no infor-
mation on whether I could expect return of a loan of a
million dollars, the incentive to abscond with which is of
an entirely different magnitude.The whole small-risks argu-
ment makes sense only if there are fundamentally trust-
worthy and untrustworthy people whose type can be
detected on the basis of their past record. Elsewhere,
though, highlighting such backward-looking judgments
is explicitly criticized.
Even the materialist microfoundations that ground the
whole approach are not carried through consistently. The
authors accept that humans are psychologically compli-
cated creatures and not incentive-calculating automata.
We are given to “cognitive paranoia” (p. 50), which can
prompt blanket hostility to those outside our trusted
group, or provoke us to sabotage the goals of overvigilant
employers. We often ignore information that contradicts
our prior convictions. Yet people “driven primarily by
values rather than by interests” would be “an odd breed
of human” (p. 115). There is no explanation given for
why paranoia and bias are less odd than moral values.
Indeed, the authors even concede that trustworthy behav-
ior may sometimes be motivated by moral commitment
or personal disposition.
Despite its intellectual amorphousness, Cooperation
Without Trust offers readers some rewards. There are vig-
orous and convincing discussions of the limitations of legal
regulation and of the conflicts of interest behind the U.S.
corporate scandals of the early 2000s. Stimulating discus-
sions on the limitations of overly general views of trust
and a related reformulation of “social capital” are also
worthy of attention. However, failures of synthesis and
consistency render the whole less than the sum of its parts.
While those interested in the topic will wish to sample
this volume, teachers of the “encapsulated interest” theory
would do better to employ Hardin’s more instructionally
focused treatment (see his Trust, 2006).
Taylor’s book is an impassioned attack on “Rational
Choice” theory—capitalized to emphasize what he sees as
unfortunate capture of the language of rationality by a
viewpoint that actually rejects its importance. A truly ratio-
nal choice, on Taylor’s view, is a reasoned one, in which
we reflect upon the implications of our foundational com-
mitments and whether they must override desires. And
this is often how we do make decisions. When we are
deeply connected to people, to our self-identification as
moral, or to places—as, say, some Native Americans are
to some traditional fishing grounds—we are not willing
to sacrifice this connection even to satisfy desires that we
would act on in other circumstances. To conceive of the
loss of such connections as a negative number is to imply
that there is some positive number that could cancel it,
such that “anyone is compensable for any loss” (p. 48).
Thus, theorists who take “Rational Choice” to be an arith-
metic operation in which numerical pros and cons are
mechanically totaled are, in practice, advocates of “an
ideology—perhaps the ideology—of disconnection, of dis-
integration” (p. 87), according to which every connection
has its price. The ideology takes especially destructive form
in cost–benefit analyses, which, asTaylor relates, have been
used to justify horrible depredations against aboriginal
populations and the natural environment.
One should not get the impression that Taylor is offer-
ing a solely normative argument. He draws on substantial
empirical support as well to ground his understanding of
human beings as regularly disdaining incentives in favor
of the commitment to their moral selves, to their habitats,
to fair reciprocity, and to communities. His view helps
explain why experimental game theory finds that people
cooperate much more often than payoff matrices would
predict. He also gives a convincing explanation of research
that demonstrates how positively employees react to being
treated with trust rather than suspicion. (Dealing with
some of the same research, Cook, Hardin, and Levi have a
much harder time fitting it into their framework.)
With its clear and lively writing, intelligent argumen-
tation, and forceful point of view, Rationality and the Ide-
ology of Disconnection should be an excellent conversation
starter in a seminar setting. Controversy may center on
whether Taylor is justified in directing so much fire at
rational choice theory. Critiques of disconnection, of a
system with, as Marx famously put it in his 1848 Com-
munist Manifesto, “no other nexus between people than
naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment’” well pre-
date the articulation of neoclassical economics. Taylor’s
vivid portrait of the effects of markets on community and
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the environment resonates with this tradition, which of
course has made critical use of incentive-based analyses.
The author himself suggests that rational choice theory is
more legitimation than motivation for the sort of actions
he decries, and that other intellectual justifications have
been offered in the past.
In any event, the idea that there are no irremediable
losses is not a necessary implication of portraying choice
as driven by incentives—one can either employ ranked
rather than numeric payoffs, or assign a negative payoff so
large that it cannot be compensated by anything possible
in a particular game. Nor are the interpersonal compari-
sons of utility involved in cost–benefit analysis sanctioned
by rational choice theory. The author is aware of these
points, but his responses are not entirely satisfactory.
Taylor’s positive intellectual program of offering alter-
native microfoundations is fully developed, but his posi-
tive political program is less so. His rejection of cost–
benefit analysis, as incompatible with the importance of
regarding certain things as invaluable, risks degenerating
into an assertion that there can be politics without hard
choices. Deliberation may make people “more likely to
consider what ought to be done for the common good”
(p. 79) but the oft-posed question of how to deal with
dissent over the common good is not addressed. And what
is there to do when what is invaluable to me is incompat-
ible with what is invaluable to you? One does not have to
support a soulless technocracy to worry that exalting the
moral significance of what we consider unique and
irreplaceable could have pernicious effects of its own.
Taylor attacks rational choice theory with the fervor of
an apostate. As he notes, he was previously a prominent
practitioner of the approach himself. When confronted
with evidence that people were far more willing to disre-
gard incentives than he had previously held, he reports,
his initial inclination was to argue that a numerically under-
stood rationality still ruled human acts, but its reign might
be limited to situations of relatively high stakes. In this
book he abandons even this retreat, in light of the evi-
dence he presents that quite massive incentives have often
proved impotent against convictions. On the other hand,
Taylor makes clear that he accepts that incentives do some-
times guide our acts. Indeed, it would be surprising if they
did not, given the many institutions (including the
cooperation-sustaining ones described by Cook, Hardin,
and Levi) that are engineered precisely to steer human
behavior through the manipulation of incentives. For their
part, these authors note that materialist considerations are
not the only foundation of trust. These mutual conces-
sions suggest that to the extent the battle over rational
choice theory is a search for the ultimately “correct” micro-
foundations of action, it is futile. Conviction and cupidity
will both have their day, and we would all benefit from
regarding them as mechanisms (see Jon Elster, “A Plea for
Mechanisms,” in P. Hedström and R. Swedberg eds., Social
Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory, 1998,
pp. 45–73), rather than final answers about human nature.
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What part does punishment play in the constitution of
political order, and under what circumstances does pun-
ishment reinforce or undermine that order? In recent
decades, suggests Keally McBride, this question has too
often been ceded by students of political science to soci-
ologists, legal scholars, and criminologists. In this discern-
ing collection of essays, McBride seeks to reclaim this turf
by asking, first, how certain pathbreaking texts have
responded to the dilemmas generated when political orders,
real or imagined, inflict suffering in response to misdeeds
and, second, how we might make, specifically, political
sense of controversies engendered by contemporary prac-
tices of punishment, especially but not exclusively in the
United States.
The volume’s opening essays offer intriguing juxtaposi-
tions of otherwise familiar texts. The first plays Thomas
More’s Utopia against Franz Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony”
in order to show how the traveler’s tale, related in each,
encourages readers to find strange those penal practices
otherwise considered unexceptional, while the second essay
opposes the inscrutable suffering endured by Job, as
recounted in the Hebrew Bible, to the rationalist account
of punishment offered by Hobbes in his Leviathan. Antici-
pating a theme that recurs throughout the book, McBride
concludes the latter essay by arguing that any effort to
redeem deliberately imposed political suffering via a purely
secular logic is in perpetual need of shoring up, which
explains why Hobbes insisted that the sovereign be con-
sidered a “mortal god.” Much the same theme is key to
the third essay’s discussion of punishment in relation to
the current debate about the contemporary status of state
sovereignty. Following the obligatory review of Carl
Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben, andMichel Foucault, this essay
reiterates McBride’s contention that, absent divine sanc-
tion, modern political orders must forever invent new ways
to negotiate the destabilizing potential that attends any
affirmation on the part of some of a right to inflict harm
on others.
In one way or another, the remaining essays all concern
the United States. Chapter 4 indicates how certain of the
Republic’s Founders articulated a penology predicated on
a form of “democratic idealism” (p. 13) in order to con-
firm the new nation’s repudiation of the authoritarian pun-
ishments characteristic of England, whereas Chapter 5
argues that this idealism has now almost entirely disap-
peared from contemporary discussions of punishment in
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